PENGARUH ASIMETRI INFORMASI TERHADAP UNDERPRICING DENGAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SEBAGAI VARIABEL MODERASI

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to empirically examine the effects of asymmetry information on underpricing with corporate governance as a moderation variable. The agency theory used here to undermine a such relationship between asymmetry information and underpricing. This research used a sample of 78 companies IPO on Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period of 2009-2013. The data analysis is the moderated regression analysis. This result showed that percentage of shares offered and institutional ownership have a negative significant effects on underpricing. Meanwhile the firm size, firm age and board independent have no significant effects on underpricing. Corporate governance do not play a moderate role between independent variable and dependent variable. Further this research imply that corporate governance can reduce asymmetry information during IPO simultaneously. The phenomenon of IPO in this research can be explained by agency theory.

Keywords : Firm Size, Percentage of Shares Offered, Firm Age, Board

Independent, Institutional Ownership